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Abstract: Scientific realism is typically associated with metaphysics. One current 
incarnation of such an association concerns the requirement of a metaphysical 
characterization of the entities one is being a realist about. This is sometimes 
called “Chakravartty’s Challenge”, and codifies the claim that without a metaphy-
sical characterization, one does not have a clear picture of the realistic commit-
ments one is engaged with. The required connection between metaphysics and 
science naturally raises the question of whether such a demand is appropriately 
fulfilled, and how metaphysics engages with science in order to produce what 
is called “scientific metaphysics”. Here, we map some of the options available in 
the literature, generating a conceptual spectrum according to how each view 
approximates science and metaphysics. This is done with the purpose of enli-
ghtening the current debate on the possibility of epistemic warrant that science 
could grant to such a metaphysics, and how different positions differently address 
the thorny issue concerning such a warrant.
Keywords: Metametaphysics. Metaphysics. Methodology of metaphysics. Na-
turalism. Scientific metaphysics.
Resumo: O realismo científico é comumente associado à metafísica. Uma en-
carnação atual de tal associação diz respeito à exigência de uma caracterização 
metafísica das entidades sobre as quais alguém está sendo realista. Isso, às 
vezes, é chamado de “Desafio de Chakravartty” e codifica a afirmação de que, 
sem uma caracterização metafísica, não se tem uma imagem clara dos com-
promissos com os quais o realismo está engajado. A conexão necessária entre a 
metafísica e a ciência naturalmente levanta a questão de saber se tal demanda 
é adequadamente satisfeita e como a metafísica se relaciona com a ciência a 
fim de produzir o que é chamado de “metafísica científica”. Aqui, mapeamos 
algumas das opções disponíveis na literatura, gerando um espectro conceitual 
de acordo com como cada visão aproxima a ciência da metafísica. Isso é feito 
com o propósito de esclarecer o debate atual sobre a possibilidade de garantia 
epistêmica que a ciência poderia conceder à metafísica, e como diferentes po-
sições abordam de forma diferente a espinhosa questão relativa à tal garantia.
Palavras-chave: Metametafísica. Metafísica. Metafísica científica. Metodologia 
da metafísica. Naturalismo.
Resumen: El realismo científico se asocia comúnmente con la metafísica. Una 
encarnación actual de tal asociación se refiere al requisito de una caracterización 
metafísica de las entidades sobre las que uno está siendo realista. A esto a veces 
se le llama “El desafío de Chakravartty” y codifica la afirmación de que sin una 
caracterización metafísica uno no tiene una imagen clara de los compromisos 
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con los que está comprometido el realismo. La cone-
xión necesaria entre la metafísica y la ciencia plantea 
naturalmente la cuestión de si tal demanda se satisface 
adecuadamente y cómo se relaciona la metafísica con 
la ciencia para producir lo que se llama “metafísica 
científica”. Aquí, mapeamos algunas de las opciones 
disponibles en la literatura, generando un espectro 
conceptual de acuerdo a cómo cada mirada se acerca a 
la ciencia de la metafísica. Esto se hace con el propósito 
de aclarar el debate actual sobre la posibilidad de una 
garantía epistémica que la ciencia podría otorgar a la 
metafísica, y cómo diferentes posiciones abordan la 
espinosa cuestión de tal garantía de manera diferente.
Palabras clave: Metametafísica. Metafísica. Metafísica 
científica. Metodología metafísica. Naturalismo.
1 Relating metaphysics with science
Metaphysics, as a philosophical discipline, is 
now more than two thousand years old. Over the 
years, a constant set of problems has solidified 
as part of it (universals, causality, and the natu-
re of substance, for instance), while some new 
problems have been added as time passed by 
(free will, the nature of possible worlds, perso-
nal identity, to mention but a few). The resilient 
nature of metaphysical problems had recently 
to face, once again in the history of the subject, 
comparisons with empirical science, with the 
latter’s ever-growing progress and success rate 
in problem-solving used as a ruler with which 
to measure the achievements of metaphysics. 
The recent revival of this kind of debate coincides 
with a growing self-awareness of metaphysicians 
that discussion is required as to the methods and 
epistemology of the discipline; that is, it coincides 
with the rise of metametaphysics, the philosophical 
discipline concerned with the foundations, me-
thodology, and epistemology of metaphysics. As 
Tahko (2015, p. 151, original emphasis) puts it, the 
epistemological question — which causes so much 
worry when comparisons to science appear — is 
so important that in many cases “[…] it is simply im-
possible to distinguish between metametaphysics 
‘proper’ and epistemology. Hence, we cannot avoid 
delving into epistemic issues when we pursue 
questions in metametaphysics; they are a central 
part of the methodology of metaphysics”.
4  In fact, the framework proposed here fits well with Chakravartty’s (2017) suggestions about metaphysical inferences: the greater its 
epistemic risk and the more open to empirical vicissitudes, the more naturalistic a proposal would appear; the lower its epistemic risk 
and the less open to empirical confrontation, the more detached from scientific evidence as a source of warrant a proposal becomes.
As one can now imagine, the confluence of the-
se two worries, the epistemology of metaphysics, 
and the comparison of the achievements of the 
discipline with the progressive nature of science, 
suggests to more than one metaphysician, and 
philosopher of science alike, that perhaps science 
has something to teach to metaphysics. Science 
and metaphysics are different, for sure, but some 
have thought that metaphysics could somehow 
benefit from science; perhaps, there is some way 
to transfer epistemic warrant from science to me-
taphysics, by making metaphysics constrained by 
science in some way. Doing so, of course, requires 
that the precise relation of metaphysics and science 
be completely explicit, and that the way such an 
epistemic warrant is obtained should be also readily 
available, and work as intended.
In this paper, following the suggestion by Tahko, 
we take the problem of framing such a relation in 
clear terms as a central concern for metametaphy-
sics. The current state of the debate concerning 
the appropriate relationship between science and 
metaphysics is so diverse and plural, that it is quite 
helpful to imagine the current situation as consisting 
of a spectrum of positions, each advancing a kind 
of relation between metaphysics and science. It is 
our aim to bring some order in the field by providing 
the first steps in that direction. Chakravartty (2007a, 
chap. 1-2) has already proposed a similar analogy 
to map the literature concerning the debate about 
scientific realism, and also used the spectrum 
analogy to deal with the degrees of metaphysical 
commitment of scientific inferences.4 Our proposal, 
unlike the aforementioned, aims to map attitudes 
about the methodological relationship between 
science and metaphysics. We can use Figure 1 as 
a graphic resource to map some of the positions in 
recent literature on the subject. We hope that, by 
bringing some of the available options to the fore, 
it will be easier to sort out what is really expected 
from such a relationship and whether there are any 
views with prospects of success.
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Figure 1 – The spectrum of metametaphysics.
Source: Prepared by the authors (2021).
Given that it is a relation between science 
and metaphysics that we are looking for, it is 
very natural that the standard way of posing the 
problem is to attempt to relate scientific realism 
to metaphysics. As this will be our starting point, 
we will follow the tradition and will not question 
this for now. The plan seems clear: it is the role 
of both metaphysics and science to provide a 
description of the world, delivering a complete 
picture of reality. Although we shall not go into 
the details, it must be recorded that “scientific 
realism” has a standard characterization, the es-
sence of which can be summed up in the claim 
that science provides an approximately true des-
cription of the world, even in its non-observational 
aspects. According to this thesis, the empirical 
success of mature and well-confirmed scientific 
theories can only be explained by their being at 
least approximately true. This, in its turn, requires 
that the posits of such theories exist (non-obser-
vable ones included), populating the world as 
described by the theory.
One apparent drawback of such a starting point 
concerns the following: if we accept that science 
populates the world with its posits and attempts a 
description of it in practically every level of com-
plexity, what role is left for metaphysics? There 
seems to be no work left for metaphysicians! 
But not all is lost. Some have found a place for 
integrating metaphysics in the efforts of produ-
cing a description of reality by suggesting that 
metaphysics helps us having a clear picture of the 
entities posited by scientific theories, in the pre-
cise sense that science populates the world with 
entities, observable and non-observable alike, 
and metaphysics comes on the top of that, com-
plementing the description of reality somehow. 
This kind of view of the complementary relation 
between metaphysics and science is what lies 
behind what Steven French called “Chakravartty’s 
Challenge”. According to Chakravartty (2007a, p. 
20), “[o]ne cannot fully appreciate what it might 
mean to be a realist until one has a clear picture 
of what one is being invited to be a realist about”.
Providing this “clear picture”, according to the 
challenge, is a necessary condition for us to cohe-
rently believe in the realistic content of scientific 
theories. The role of metaphysics would be to 
add to the picture already provided by science 
and help us achieve the required clarity on the 
image provided. Explaining how to do that would 
amount to providing the required link between 
metaphysics and science, and also to explaining 
how metaphysical theories could benefit from 
science, after all. We shall employ this setting of 
the problem as a methodological guide in our 
attempt to map the distinct ways in which science 
can be related to metaphysics. Certainly, other 
starting points could be used as well, but we see 
this one as providing quite a useful common grou-
nd, mainly because it takes the required science 
for granted. The core of our proposal here is to 
classify the tone of the approaches and responses 
to the challenge, direct or indirect, obtained in the 
literature, under a metametaphysical spectrum.
Figure 1 is a graphic resource for such a ma-
pping, and it should be interpreted as follows: 
the proposals positioned in the spectrum with 
one of the triangular ends are the proposals that 
accept Chakravartty’s Challenge as a demand 
for complementary work of metaphysics and 
science. Proposals mapped with a circle, both at 
the ends of the spectrum and outside it, are the 
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proposals that refuse the Challenge.5 Notice that, 
in the context of this paper, refusing the Challenge 
indicates that one somehow denies that meta-
physics should receive any kind of warrant from 
science, with no hopes that epistemic credibility 
may flow from science to metaphysics. Both 
full-blooded positions present “easy” answers 
for the integration of science and metaphysics, 
e.g., integration is not welcomed, not required, 
or must be even rejected. We’ll start from there. 
As we shall see, radical positions, lying in the 
extremes of the spectrum, have not a problem 
of integration of metaphysics and science due 
to the rejection of the need for integration. That 
counts in favor or against them, depending on 
one’s view on the legitimacy of the claim behind 
Chakravartty’s Challenge.
2 The extreme cases
2.1 Full-blooded Naturalism
A first answer to the challenge would consist 
in denying that obtaining a clear picture requires 
that one goes beyond the resources of science. 
The claim, according to this line of thought, is that 
metaphysics (understood as a purely aprioristic 
discipline) is not required for the development of 
objective knowledge about reality. We will call this 
position “full-blooded naturalism”, which somehow 
avoids introducing properly metaphysical concepts 
in the workings of science. Full-blooded naturalists, 
like Quine and his current followers, would deny 
the challenge if the idea of a clear picture is to be 
achieved by adding metaphysics to science.6 The 
reason is the impression that metaphysics fails to 
contribute to the general economy of science, or 
that some additional layer is needed.
Roughly speaking, it is claimed that metaphysics 
does not contribute to scientific functioning and 
scientific explanations. Therefore, full-blooded 
naturalists do not need this extra layer of theory 
over science. In a slogan form, they would say: we 
5  Or, at least, they refuse in terms that we are understanding the Challenge itself (BUENO, 2019).
6  Quine’s philosophical position is not easy to locate: on one hand, one may identify him as an empiricist; on the other hand, one may 
argue that he thinks that metaphysics and science are continuous, meaning that he is not an ‘enemy’ of metaphysics in a strong sense. It 
is, however, precisely this sense of continuity with science in Quine’s view of ‘metaphysics’ that aligns him with the full-blooded naturalist 
end of the spectrum, as it implies that metaphysics, as a discipline, has no autonomy whatsoever. Any specifically metaphysical pursuit 
that does not concern science, such as the nature of properties (universals or tropes?), is of no concern for a Quinean naturalist.
shouldn’t care about metaphysics; only scientific 
questions matter, and these are answered at the level 
of the scientific theory itself; we are left at the level 
of the posits of the theory. In current terminology, 
when the focus is on ontology, this is also called 
a ‘shallow’ version of realism, a realism that does 
not go beyond what science itself says. Realism 
with metaphysics is called ‘deep realism’ (see also 
our discussion of the Viking approach). The shallow 
realist view is summarized by Burgess:
For many professed ‘realists’, realism amounts 
to little more than a willingness to repeat in 
one’s philosophical moments what one says 
in one’s scientific moments, not taking it back, 
explaining it away, or otherwise apologizing for 
it: what we say in our scientific moments is all 
right, though no claim is made that it is uniquely 
right, or that other intelligent beings who con-
ceptualized the world differently from us would 
necessarily be getting something wrong. For 
many professed ‘anti-realists’, realism seems 
rather to amount to a claim that what one says 
to oneself in scientific moments when one tries 
to understand the universe corresponds to 
Ultimate Metaphysical Reality, that it is, so to 
speak, a repetition of just what God was saying 
to Himself when He was creating the universe 
(BURGESS, 2004, p. 19, original emphasis).
So, the idea is that the shallow realist, or full-
-blooded naturalist, has no other access to reality 
except the one provided by science. Nothing in 
addition to that is needed or required. Perhaps, 
the kind of approach to metaphysics that the 
full-blooded naturalist would adopt follows very 
closely the strategy suggested by Maddy (2005) in 
her discussion about positing mathematics along 
with the sciences, and not positing corresponding 
entities for astrology. Just as it happens to astro-
logy, it could be argued, metaphysics contributes 
nothing to the objective description of the world 
(according to such naturalists), it even sometimes 
contradicts science. Then, as a result, one may (if 
ever) approach metaphysics only sociologically, 
or psychologically; just as one does not need to 
take the posits of astrology into account when 
dealing with science, one does not need to take 
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into account metaphysics when accounting for 
the working of science and the emerging picture 
of reality. Maddy says:
My answer to this question, suggested above, 
has been that mathematics is used in science, 
so the naturalist’s scientific study of science 
must include an account of how its methods 
work and how the theories so generated mana-
ge to contribute as they do to scientific know-
ledge. Astrology and theology are not used 
in science — indeed, in some versions they 
contradict science — so the naturalist needs 
only to approach them sociologically or psy-
chologically. (MADDY, 2005, p. 449).
Questions not answered by science, or even 
without any prospect of being investigated scien-
tifically, would be questions that full-blooded 
naturalists would not be interested in (Maddy 
2005). This does not mean that they would be 
considered pseudoquestions, but only that the 
interest of naturalists in such metaphysical is-
sues would be so limited that they simply do 
not enter the debate, adopting, as pointed out 
by Wolff (2019), a form of “quietism” concerning 
metaphysics.
In this sense, then, to a Quinean naturalist, 
metaphysics, as the specifically philosophical 
discipline, fails to contribute with the general 
economy of science (i.e., its operation of providing 
for predictions and explanations). So they don’t 
need this extra theoretical layer over science in 
order to somehow ‘complete’ the picture of reality 
advanced by science. As remarked by Lewis (2016, 
p. xiii), with a touch of reductionism, a full-bloo-
ded naturalist could remorselessly claim that “[…] 
metaphysics is just physics, perhaps expressed 
in more philosopher-friendly terms”. Also along 
these lines, as Lowe (1998, p. 4-5) summarized, 
a full-blooded naturalist would say that the only 
possible metaphysics is physics itself.
[…] to the extent that there is a legitimate pro-
vince of metaphysical inquiry, it is one entirely 
catered for by the empirical sciences. On this 
view, it is these sciences, if anything, that can 
tell us about the fundamental structure of 
reality. This being so, there can be no scope 
for a distinctly “philosophical” approach to the 
questions of metaphysics, conceived as an 
approach different in its methods or objects 
from those already embraced by the empirical 
sciences. For instance, if there are fundamental 
questions to be raised about the existence and 
nature of space and time, it seems to follow that 
these can only be answered by such sciences 
as cosmology and quantum physics. There 
can be no room for “armchair” philosophical 
speculation or “conceptual analysis” as routes 
to addressing such questions. To the extent 
that metaphysical questions are genuinely 
answerable, it will be said that they are being 
answered by people working in departments of 
physics, not by people working in departments 
of philosophy (LOWE, 1998, p. 4-5).
The full-blooded naturalist attitude totally 
separates metaphysics from science, foreseeing 
the abandonment of any kind of expectation of 
forming a worldview based on the completion 
of science by metaphysics; thus abandoning any 
form of attempt to endow metaphysics with some 
epistemic warrant from science. 
In short, due to its lack of confidence that 
metaphysics is required for an overall reasona-
ble picture of reality, the full-blooded naturalist 
denies that Chakravartty’s Challenge must be 
answered at all — let alone, by adding a meta-
physical layer over science. Given that the issues 
involved far outstrip what science does and can 
investigate, at least so far, metaphysics, as the 
philosophical discipline, is better kept out of any 
attempt of establishing a world view. One may 
either deny or remain silent about such questions; 
there is an epistemic gap between the reaches of 
science and the problems of metaphysics so that 
it is metaphysics that must go. For this reason, 
it is epistemically weak, and therefore it is, as 
Chakravartty (2013, p. 29) says, a “[…] misguided 
philosophical pursuit”.
That said, let us present the other extremity 
of the spectrum.
2.2 Full-blooded Metaphysics
Full-blooded metaphysicians also seem to 
have a very straightforward answer about the 
relation between metaphysics and science: me-
taphysics is the first science. Empirical science 
would therefore not have an epistemic priority 
over metaphysics. Quite the opposite. Think of 
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Aristotle’s view or, more recently, Lowe’s (1998, 
p. 5) view of metaphysics, according to which 
metaphysics makes investigations into every 
possible characterization of what the world could 
be like, and science eventually instantiates (but 
cannot fail to submit to) such possibilities: “[…] 
empirical science is dependent upon metaphy-
sics and cannot usurp the latter’s proper role”. To 
cite an anti-realist example on the spectrum of 
full-blooded metaphysics, Benovsky (2016, chap. 
5) argues that science should not be demanded 
to give epistemological credentials to support 
metaphysics. For him, scientific theories are pro-
visional, whereas metaphysical theories are not 
susceptible to empirical refutation. In this way, 
it is metaphysics that should underpin all other 
areas of knowledge, including science, and that 
foundation should be immune from empirical 
revision, or the need for a scientific warrant.
For full-blooded metaphysicians, metaphysics 
is the condition of possibility and the background 
on which empirical science operates. No me-
taphysics, conceived as a priori and universal, 
should be justified by science. Science should 
not even address metaphysical issues, since 
metaphysical problems (a priori and universal) are 
outside the purview of its field of investigation. 
As Hofweber (2021, p. 423) puts it, metaphysics 
is described as a “glorious” discipline by the 
full-blooded metaphysician, which is somehow 
considered to be the “queen of sciences” in the 
following sense.
Only in metaphysics do we see the larger 
picture of what reality is like, although smaller 
parts of this picture are painted in the individual 
sciences. Metaphysics is a central hub whe-
re all the pieces are being put together. The 
sciences each deliver their results to this hub, 
and philosophy and metaphysics put them all 
together into one overall picture of reality, pos-
sibly with some additions and augmentations. 
So understood, metaphysics has a domain and 
it has its own domain: it concerns certain large-
-scale facts about how the different domains 
investigated in the particular sciences come 
together and relate to each other. Metaphysics 
thus has a special place in inquiry, it is the 
central place where the puzzle pieces are 
being put together (HOFWEBER, 2021, p. 423).
Put in a slogan form, full-blooded metaphysics 
would say: we must not ground metaphysics on 
science, but, rather, ground science on metaphysics. 
In other words, we could say that, according to 
this view, we have the requirement that meta-
physics does not derive its epistemic creden-
tials from science; rather, science must always 
fit into the schemes proposed by metaphysics. 
In such a view, science has no preference over 
metaphysics:
Empirical science at most tells us what is the 
case, not what must or may be (but happens not 
to be) the case. Metaphysics deals in possibili-
ties. And only if we can delimit the scope of the 
possible can we hope to determine empirically 
what is actual. This is why empirical science 
is dependent upon metaphysics and cannot 
usurp the latter’s proper role (LOWE, 1998, p. 
5, original emphasis).
This full-blooded attitude not only separa-
tes entirely metaphysics from science, but also 
provides for the abandonment of the questions 
and answers posed by empirical science, as an 
epistemic aid to metaphysics, under the argument 
of its provisionality; metaphysics should stick 
only to universal issues — not to transitory ones, 
as science does. Thus, the epistemological role 
that science plays in supporting metaphysics is 
not even a question for full-blooded metaphy-
sicians. To further illustrate a case in point of this 
kind of attitude towards metaphysics, consider 
once again Lowe’s conception of the discipline.
Metaphysics, properly conceived, is the study 
of the most fundamental structure of reality 
and involves the attempt to determine what 
categories of things can and do exist, which 
in turn involves understanding the nature or 
essence of the things in question and hence 
their existence and identity conditions (LOWE, 
2011, p. 108).
In this case, because of its subject-matter, 
metaphysics is an autonomous and irreducible 
discipline:
[…] no empirical science can legitimately have 
the concerns of metaphysics, since any such 
science is confined to the study of just one 
part or aspect of reality as a whole. Nor can the 
conjunction of all empirical sciences replace 
metaphysics in its task, for none of these scien-
ces has the authority to adjudicate whether or 
not its theories and findings are compatible 
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with those of the others. Each science pur-
sues truth within a limited domain. […] Only a 
discipline whose proper subject-matter is the 
fundamental structure of reality as a whole can 
have the authority to adjudicate whether the 
theories and findings of one empirical science 
are consistent with those of another. And that 
discipline can only be metaphysics (LOWE, 
2011, p. 104).
Metaphysics deals with issues that are relevant 
for science, but science cannot have a role in es-
tablishing epistemic constraints on metaphysics. 
The metametaphysical question at stake is the 
methodological priority based on the epistemic 
priority of each area: the full-blooded meta-
physician will say that metaphysics has its own 
epistemic credentials, while the full-blooded na-
turalist will say that metaphysics has no epistemic 
credentials at all. It is easy to see that both full-
-blooded attitudes are straightforwardly against 
the relationship between their areas: they would 
remorselessly say that “my field takes the lead”. 
It is easy to see that there is no common ground 
between the full-blooded parts of the debate 
since the epistemological role of the foundation of 
one discipline by the other is mutually exclusive. 
The way in which both full-blooded alternatives 
respond to Chakravartty’s Challenge is there-
fore of limited interest here — and perhaps the 
Challenge is not a legitimate challenge for these 
extreme positions, if it is understood as requiring 
collaborative work of science and metaphysics. 
2.3 Empiricism
Before we move on to the intermediate cases of 
the spectrum, let us discuss one more case, given 
that it is a bit out of the continuum of cases we 
focus on, and still, is related to the connection (or 
rather failure thereof) of metaphysics and science. 
It concerns modern versions of empiricism. In 
order to classify their situation properly, it is useful 
to distinguish between two major approaches of 
naturalism, following the literature on the subject: 
there are ontological versions of naturalism on 
the one hand, and there are epistemological and 
methodological versions of naturalism on the 
other. Basically, ontological versions of naturalism 
state that the world is populated by the entities of 
science observable and non-observable. Metho-
dological and epistemological naturalists suggest, 
in different ways, that the legitimate methods for 
knowledge acquisition are the methods of scien-
ce (for a detailed discussion, see Bryant, 2020a). 
Modern empiricists, contrary to commonsensical 
expectations, deviate not only from full-blooded 
metaphysical stance, but also from full-blooded 
naturalism, which would incorporate both views 
on naturalism (that is, that science has the method 
to provide us the catalogue of reality, and the 
appropriate means to know them, as a shallow 
realist would have it too). Let us check. 
The first point of conflict with naturalism comes 
with the empiricist adoption of a ‘philosophy first’ 
position from an epistemological side; modern 
empiricists take quite seriously the claim that 
experience is the guide for what is real and for 
how it is. This is because its criterion of evalua-
tion for the existence of unobservable entities, 
for example, is either stronger than or prior to 
what would be indicated by science itself, which 
complements experience with a wide array of 
methods and techniques to access reality going 
beyond experience. In this sense, empiricism is 
not naturalistic, because there is no scientific 
reason for one to privilege the knowledge of ob-
servable entities solely (CHAKRAVARTTY, 2007b, 
p. 186). The reasons for putting the weight on 
perceptual evidence are mostly philosophical. 
It results from this emphasis on experience that 
empiricists do not accept the epistemic authority 
of science on what concerns the existence of 
non-observable entities. Ontological naturalism 
goes by the board too, then; on what concerns 
the non-observable posits of science, given that 
they go beyond what is licensed by experience, 
the epistemic authority of science is limited by 
a philosophical view. 
However, just like the more radical versions of 
naturalism (which are identified with the shallow 
realism above), empiricists end up also moving 
away from Full-blooded Metaphysics, since it also 
does not satisfy their epistemic criteria. As Bueno 
(2019, p. 8) states, structural empiricism (a form 
of empiricism) “[…] insists that only those items 
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for which one has evidence of a particular sort 
warrant ontological commitment, namely, items 
that are observable in the broad sense that they 
satisfy counterfactual dependence conditions 
analogous to those met by perception”. This cuts 
out of the picture both items in the naturalistic 
ontology, as well as the need for a clear image 
of such posits in terms of a metaphysics that 
exceeds the sources of our knowledge.
As a result, this viewpoint has, according to 
Bueno (2019, p. 8), “[…] the virtue of avoiding 
Chakravartty’s challenge”. This happens preci-
sely because the “structural empiricist resists 
the temptation to reify what is posited in one’s 
ontology”, i.e., resists the demand to answer ques-
tions that concern the nature (the “clear picture” 
required by the Challenge) of the entities that the 
scientific theories deal with.
Rejecting the stronger theses of both opposites 
discussed so far, there is nothing for the empiricist 
to integrate (recall, Chakravartty’s Challenge, as 
a beckon for integration between the two areas, 
is denied). For these reasons, we consider the 
current empiricists as outside of the spectrum 
of the efforts on the integration of metaphysics 
and science. In one sense, they side with the 
metaphysicians in not giving to science any epis-
temic privilege over knowledge, but they also 
side with the naturalists when they claim that 
the metaphysicians’ standards and aims are far 
outside what is justified by our human epistemic 
condition. This may be seen as an advantage, 
but it also has the problem of being held ina-
dequate by both of the more radical views: the 
resulting image of reality is just too crude for the 
full-blooded metaphysician, who wants a richer 
description, and in its epistemology, it is just too 
much first-philosophical for the naturalist, who 
wants unrestricted science to guide us in our 
epistemology and ontology.
Note that we are not saying that the empiri-
cist shares with metaphysicians the idea of not 
conceiving science as one of the most important 
sources of information about the world: empi-
ricists take science — and above all empirical 
evidence — extremely seriously, which is why they 
question metaphysics. There are several forms of 
empiricism, many of which (such as constructive 
empiricism) recognize that there is always some 
metaphysical aspect involved in describing the 
world, and even other versions (such as structural 
empiricism) do not adopt an attitude that prioriti-
zes philosophy rather than science, as they seek 
to understand science in its own terms instead 
of introducing metaphysical categories to do so.
Here, in fact, we are working with a very ge-
neral idea of current empiricism, and one of 
the risks of this is to oversimplify this stance. 
However, we call attention to a characteristic 
that seemed common to the numerous forms of 
empiricism: it would not be the case to say that 
empiricism denies the importance of science as 
one of the most important sources of information 
about the world. The point is that the empiricist 
is more demanding than science itself on some 
issues, such as the justification for the claims 
concerning existence of unobservable entities. 
And that demand, in the terms we put it, would 
be more metaphysical than naturalistic. There is 
a tension between empiricism and naturalism 
about ontology and epistemology/methodology. 
In our classification, the naturalist is the one who 
takes science seriously on its own terms, and the 
empiricist introduces epistemological demands 
from outside science. The empiricist puts the epis-
temic value of science above metaphysics, but 
on the terms we are concerned with in this paper, 
i.e., establishing a relation between science and 
metaphysics, empiricists seem to impose their 
own empirical filters on both fronts, which leads 
to neither adopting one of the mentioned extreme 
positions and also neither accepting integration; 
the empiricists’ epistemic demands creates then 
a position that lies outside the spectrum.
The claim that empiricism takes science se-
riously, and therefore questions metaphysics, is 
quite common. But it is a claim that assumes that 
metaphysics is incompatible with science, and 
that, in turn, is an empiricist — unscientific thesis. 
A legitimate naturalist simply remains silent about 
metaphysics, while the empiricist rejects meta-
physics. In this sense, empiricism is already an 
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anti-metaphysical thesis, against the integration 
between metaphysics and science, and this is a 
component that we are calling first-philosophical.7
To complement this discussion on the curious 
position of modern empiricism, a mix of respect 
for science with first-philosophical approaches, 
notice that it is the more recent versions of em-
piricism that conflict with naturalism. Although 
current empiricism is anti-metaphysical, it is also, 
in some sense, an interpretation of science that 
does accept it as an epistemic authority. This cle-
arly has generated some tension in the history of 
empiricism, with anti-metaphysical tendencies not 
necessarily shocking with the scientific attitude 
per se. As Psillos puts it: 
There has been an empiricist tradition in the 
core of Logical Positivism/Empiricism, star-
ting with Moritz Schlick and ending in Herbert 
Feigl (via Hans Reichenbach) which has taken 
it to be the case that empiricism need not be 
characterised by ‘phobia of the invisible and 
the intangible’ as Feigl once put it—after all, 
this phobia would be uncharacteristic of the 
empiricist spirit precisely because it would take 
something other than science, say some phi-
losophical prejudices, as a guide to what there 
is in the world. According to this tradition, the 
world of empiricism need not be a barren place 
devoid of all the explanatory entities posited 
by scientific theories; and yet, empiricism need 
not compromise its anti-metaphysical attitude 
(PSILLOS, 2011, p. 303).
Now, this brings some interesting distinctions 
on versions of empiricism to the fore. Clearly, 
Logical Empiricists of the tradition mentioned 
by Psillos are closer to the sort of full-blooded 
naturalism that we have been describing than 
the current versions of empiricism. Interesting 
as it is, we shall leave a discussion of this topic 
for another occasion.
3 Mapping the middle ground
The terrain between the two ends of the spec-
trum promises the integration of the best of both 
worlds. On the one hand, it does not yield to full-
-blooded naturalization, which makes it possible 
7  Note that empiricism bears a resemblance to the full-blooded metaphysician: full-blooded metaphysicians value the fact that scien-
ce fits their scheme, but if it doesn’t, it is science that must be reinterpreted. To see this, just consider Benovsky’s (2016) claims, for a 
metaphysician, and consider van Fraassen’s (1991) claims, for example, for the empiricist versions of quantum mechanics and empiricist 
interpretations of probability.
to raise questions about the nature of entities, 
and, therefore, enables it to address Chakravart-
ty’s Challenge as it was originally intended by 
French. On the other hand, they allegedly import 
certain epistemic credentials of science and, 
therefore, have epistemic justification — which 
does not occur (nor it is desired) by full-blooded 
metaphysics. In a few words: we may have our 
science and our metaphysics not only living in 
peaceful coexistence, but also, the successful 
empirical science lends epistemic credentials 
to the metaphysics that gets associated with it.
We will provisionally call this range of the 
spectrum “scientific metaphysics”. Although in-
teresting, as they aim to benefit from the positive 
parts of each radical position, the cases in the 
middle of the spectrum are the most problematic, 
as we shall see.
In what follows, we will offer a mapping of 
recent positions in the literature that covers the 
terrain of scientific metaphysics.
3.1 Naturalisms
To mention a recent taxonomy on the subject, 
what we call here “full-blooded naturalism” bro-
adly corresponds to what Bryant (2020a, p. 49) 
called “global metaphysical naturalism”, while the 
naturalisms in this section would be variations of 
what she calls “naturalistic metaphysics” — which 
is basically a metaphysics that is “approached 
through a scientific lens”. McKenzie (2020, p. 2) 
mapped two attitudes towards the naturaliza-
tion of metaphysics: a “negative” and a “positive” 
claim of naturalistic metaphysics. The negative 
claim states that it is not worth doing any kind of 
metaphysics that is not informed by science. This 
group portrays very well the theses firstly pro-
posed by Ladyman and Ross (2007) concerning 
the methodology of metaphysics. It is important 
to emphasize that the negative attitude is the 
common ground of the dispute over the mid-
dle ground of the spectrum. That is, directly or 
indirectly, all the other proposals mapped here 
10/21 Veritas, Porto Alegre, v. 66, n. 1, p. 1-21, jan.-dez. 2021 | e-41217
respond to the negative attitude, which we will 
call “metaphysics naturalized”.
The second group mapped by McKenzie (2020, 
p. 4) is also related to the naturalization project, 
but it is definitely more liberal than the negati-
ve attitude. McKenzie calls this second group 
“positive claim of naturalized metaphysics”, cha-
racterized by the statement that it is worth doing 
metaphysics, as long as it is informed by science. 
Although she considers that both statements 
are endorsed by naturalistic metaphysicians, we 
think it is appropriate to distinguish them in two 
proposals, one of which is more radical than the 
other. Let’s start with the more radical of the two.
3.1.1 Metaphysics naturalized
To this group, the distinction between a “tra-
ditional” metaphysics and a “naturalized” one is 
essential. As pointed out by McLeod and Parsons 
(2013), a clear distinction between the two ways 
of doing metaphysics often misses the mark. This 
problem, however, did not prevent the distinction 
from being made, thus giving rise to a terminolo-
gical mess. The first kind of metaphysics has many 
names: “neo-scholastic” (ROSS; SPURRETT, 2004), 
“analytic”, “armchair”, “traditional” (LADYMAN; 
ROSS, 2007), “fantasy” (FRENCH; MCKENZIE, 
2012), “intuition-based” (GUAY; PRADEU, 2020), 
“free-range” (BRYANT, 2020b) and “a priori” me-
taphysics (MCKENZIE, 2020).
Let us assume, for now, that they all refer to 
the same thing, say, the caricatured case that we 
call here “full-blooded metaphysics” — and let us 
call it “analytic metaphysics”, so that we do not 
introduce yet another name in the literature. As 
pointed out by McKenzie (2020, p. 1-2), the litera-
ture engaged with naturalization considers that 
analytic metaphysics is: “irrelevant” and “pseu-
doscientific” (LADYMAN; ROSS, p. 17), “frivolous” 
(FRENCH; MCKENZIE, 2015, p. 28), “sterile” and 
“empty” (CALLENDER, 2001, p. 34), and “episte-
mically inadequate” (BRYANT, 2020b, p. 1867).
Perhaps the fiercest criticism of the so-called 
“analytical” way of producing metaphysics was 
advanced in the now-classic Every Thing Must 
Go by Ladyman and Ross (2007), whose work is, 
without exaggeration, a milestone in this metame-
taphysical discussion about the nature of analytic 
metaphysics, and all later literature can be seen 
as a response and reaction to them — after all, 
they introduce polarization into the debate. The 
essence of their criticism is already distilled in 
the introduction: “[…] contemporary analytical 
metaphysics is a professional activity engaged 
in by some extremely intelligent and morally 
serious people, fails to qualify as part of the en-
lightened pursuit of objective truth, and should 
be discontinued” (LADYMAN; ROSS, 2007, p. vii).
This kind of naturalist expectation is to extract 
metaphysics from science somehow. Metaphy-
sical investigations, instead of being treated as 
pseudo-problems, would have answers extracted 
from the scientific theories themselves. In this 
sense, science would not only inform metaphysics 
but, also, it would help us answer metaphysical 
questions. Thus, naturalists of this type claim that 
“science, especially physics, has shown us that the 
universe is very strange to our inherited conception 
of what it is like” (LADYMAN; ROSS, 2007, p. 10). In 
other words, to this metametaphysical conception, 
metaphysics should be “[…] a unified world-view 
derived from the details of scientific research” 
(LADYMAN; ROSS, 2007, p. 65, emphasis added).
Only these questions would be worthy of in-
tellectual respect, so that all other questions that 
cannot be asked or answered by science — that is, 
questions proper to analytical metaphysics — must 
be abandoned. To sum up, Wallace (2012, p. 3-4) 
nicely characterizes it, this kind of naturalism is “[…] 
the thesis that we have no better guide to meta-
physics than the successful practice of science”.
Chakravartty’s Challenge is then answered 
as follows by naturalized metaphysics: the clear 
image is filled with the metaphysical content 
extracted from the scientific theories themselves. 
From a methodological perspective, although a 
scientific-realistic view may be challenged by ar-
guments involving underdetermination (FRENCH; 
KRAUSE, 2006; SKLAR, 2010), what counts for 
the naturalist is that the metaphysical content is 
extracted from scientific theories.
The idea that metaphysical content can be 
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endowed with scientific justification when it is so-
mehow extracted from the theoretical content of 
science is, as we are mentioning, the most radical 
attempt at establishing one such relation between 
metaphysics and science. In this sense, as Robus 
(2015) stressed, the proponents of this kind of 
metaphysical naturalism would say that science 
“licenses” metaphysics. The plan, it seems, is that 
the theoretical context of science may also come 
with some metaphysical content, in order to give 
us a picture of reality. French and Krause (2006, 
p. 244) have put the issue very clearly on what 
concerns issues of identity and individuality for 
quantum particles. Thus, the particles, as posited 
by quantum mechanics, should somehow also 
provide an answer as to the issue of their indi-
viduality or non-individuality (the ‘metaphysical 
component’ of the theoretical content of the 
theory). If that cannot be done in this particular 
case (concerning individuality) due to the lack 
of information provided by quantum mechanics 
(generating metaphysical underdetermination), 
then, rather than abandoning the project of so-
mehow deriving a metaphysics from physics, it 
is suggested that the metaphysical basis must 
be changed (so that, ideally, scientific support 
for metaphysics may still be successfully sought 
under the same kind of ‘extracting’ procedure):
[…] if that theoretical content is taken to have a 
metaphysical component, in the sense that the 
realist’s commitment to a particular ontology 
needs to be articulated in metaphysical terms, 
and in particular with regard to the individuality 
or non-individuality of the particles, then the 
realist appears to face a situation in which there 
are two, metaphysically inequivalent, approa-
ches between which no choice can be made 
based on the physics itself. […] The choice for 
the realist is stark: either fall into some form 
of antirealism or drop the aforementioned 
metaphysical component and adopt an onto-
logically less problematic position (FRENCH; 
KRAUSE, 2006, p. 244).
Physics should somehow be responsible for in-
dicating the metaphysical profile of its entities (e.g., 
are they individuals or non-individuals?) because 
only then this attribution of a metaphysical profile 
8  Here we generalize the notion put forth by Branding and Skiles (2012) of “individuality profile” to a ‘metaphysical profile’, which is not 
restricted to the debate concerning (non-)individuals (see French, 2014).
will be justified.8 However, as French and Krause 
are quick to point out, physics fails in doing that, 
because it is compatible with both profiles, indi-
viduals and non-individuals. As a result, we have 
metaphysical underdetermination, and the meta-
physics of individuality somehow floats free from 
the theoretical content, being it the case that we 
can understand the relevant physics with each of 
the two available options and still have a consistent 
picture. The same kind of demand or expectation 
that physics should answer this kind of question 
(again, about the individuality of particles) was frame 
by Ladyman, in the following terms (where it is also 
recognized that physics can’t do that):
We need to recognize the failure of our best 
theories to determine even the most fun-
damental ontological characteristic of the 
purported entities they feature. It is an ersatz 
form of realism that recommends belief in the 
existence of entities that have such ambiguous 
metaphysical status. What is required is a shift 
to a different ontological basis altogether, one 
for which questions of individuality simply do 
not arise (LADYMAN, 1998, p. 419-420, original 
emphasis).
That is: realism and the metaphysical profile 
are one of a piece. If our form of realism cannot 
answer the metaphysical question, then, it is an 
ersatz realism (in other words: a legitimate form 
of realism must answer Chakravartty’s Challenge 
and, moreover, extract the metaphysical picture 
from the realistic content of the theory). Ladyman 
then recommends that we change the ontological 
basis i.e. that we forget about particular objects, 
so that problems of individuality do not arise, and 
shift to an ontology of structures (as the above-
-mentioned quote of French and Krause also 
recommended). What is important for us is the 
hope, underlying this kind of claim, that science 
gives us an answer to metaphysical questions 
too. We must somehow extract the answer for 
a metaphysical problem from the theoretical 
content of science. If that cannot be done for the 
metaphysics of objects, then, let us try to do that 
for a metaphysics of structures.
It is important to notice how this differs from the 
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full-blooded naturalist attitude seen before. While 
the full-blooded naturalist denied any need to 
answer Chakravartty’s Challenge in the intended 
sense of integrating the two fields, the naturalist 
we are discussing now accepts that metaphysics 
does play a role in a complete description of 
reality. However, the thought now is that this will 
only go as far as the metaphysics is somehow 
authorized by science, where ‘authorized’ is a 
neutral word for the idea that epistemic warrant 
must be conferred to the metaphysical content of 
the view directly by the scientific theory (extracted 
from science, as we have put before, in the sense 
that it follows from the theoretical content of the 
scientific theory itself).
3.1.2 Logos approach
According to the ‘logos approach’ to quantum 
mechanics, mainly developed by de Ronde (2019; 
see also de Ronde and Massri, 2021; de Ronde and 
Massri, 2019a; de Ronde and Massri, 2019b), we 
should take metaphysical lessons from quantum 
mechanics; the theory should be understood “[…] 
in close analogy to the Aristotelian hylomorphic 
metaphysical scheme”. Specifically, the reformu-
lation of the concepts of “potential realm” and 
“power”. This is so because these are the subject 
matter of quantum mechanics: immanent powers: 
“[a]ccording to the logos approach, QM does not 
talk about ‘small particles’, it talks about a potential 
realm — independent of actuality — represented in 
terms of immanent powers with definite potentia” 
(DE RONDE; MASSRI, 2019b, p. 16).
It is argued that previous attempts to apply Aris-
totelian metaphysics of potentialities to current 
physics (HEISENBERG, 1958), as well as disposi-
tionalist interpretations (MARGENAU, 1958), would 
have well-defined metaphysical starting points or 
presuppositions, and it would be these starting 
points that created problems in the foundations of 
quantum physics; they bring in assumptions that 
are at odds with the description of reality provided 
by quantum mechanics, or so de Ronde claims.
As de Ronde (2019, p. 138) argues, in the first 
case, Heisenberg would have been committed 
from the start with an “actualist account of reality”. 
In a closely related sense, Margenau’s dispositio-
nalism would define the existence of potentialities 
in actual terms, that is, “[…] only in relation to the 
process of actualization and the observability of 
‘clicks’ and detectors” (DE RONDE, 2019, p. 143). 
According to de Ronde (2019), there is an ortho-
doxy in the philosophy of physics that starts from 
metaphysical assumptions both a posteriori and 
common sense, both based on an (unproblema-
tized) notion of ‘observation’. One of the main 
problems with such a metaphysical assumption 
being to treat observation as given and unpro-
blematized — as if physicists were supposed to 
investigate clicks in measurement apparatuses 
rather than study fundamental aspects of what 
gives the discipline its name in the first place: 
physis (the Greek term for ‘reality’ or ‘nature’). In 
particular, these assumptions would encapsulate 
unwarranted categorizations of reality in terms of 
notions that simply do not apply in the quantum 
realm, notions such as ‘objects’ and ‘actuality’. 
Given the inappropriateness of this strategy, de 
Ronde recommends that we simply turn it around: 
“[…] our approach stresses the need to provide a 
conceptual representation of the mathematical 
formalism, one which need not be constrained 
or reduced to our ‘common sense’ observability 
of tables and chairs” (DE RONDE, 2019, p. 143).
So, thinking about the taxonomy adopted here, 
the logos approach is a proposal that orbits be-
tween the “traditional” and “metaphysics of scien-
ce” regions of the content axis. It is traditional 
because it is inspired by the Aristotelian concept 
of “potentiality” (or “dynamis”), but it is also a “me-
taphysics of science” in as much as it relates with 
science in its goal. It is a revisionary project, to the 
extent that it reformulates concepts of traditional 
metaphysics for the purposes of science, and a 
priori in the sense that it goes from metaphysics 
to physics. So, as de Ronde (2019, p. 144) argues, 
instead of presupposing from the start “[…] the 
controversial idea that actual observations are 
perfectly well defined”, it is more fruitful to “[…] 
concentrate on the formal-conceptual level”. To 
sum up his proposal in methodological terms, de 
Ronde (2019, p. 145) says: “[w]e believe that an 
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important help could be provided by philosophers 
of physics who should be in charge of trying to 
develop a conceptual representation of quantum 
superpositions that would allow us to think in a 
truly quantum mechanical manner”.
In methodological terms, de Ronde proposes 
that the development of an appropriate meta-
physics can lead to a better understanding of 
current physics, so it is tempting to locate his 
proposal within the ‘metaphysics first!’ region 
of the spectrum insofar as it seems to attribute 
primacy to metaphysics over physics:
According to our viewpoint, there is no physical 
observation without the aid of a network of 
adequate concepts. It is important to stress at 
this point that we use the term ‘metaphysics’ to 
refer to the systematic definition of conceptual 
schemes. A metaphysical scheme is a concep-
tual net of interrelated concepts. It provides 
the very preconditions of observability itself 
(DE RONDE, 2019, p. 126).
But, on closer examination, it turns that this me-
taphysics is extracted from quantum mechanics 
itself, i.e., immanent powers represents the most 
appropriate conceptual (metaphysical) scheme 
for quantum mechanics because it captures what 
the theory is really talking about:9 “the represen-
tation and understanding of reality can be only 
achieved through the analysis of metaphysical 
conceptual schemes which are provided by phy-
sical theories themselves” (DE RONDE, 2019, p. 
126). Based on this, we think it is the appropriate 
place for the logos approach to quantum me-
chanics in the spectrum of Figure 1 is among 
the proposals for naturalization of metaphysics 
presented in the previous subsections — since 
it is in a position of tension between developing 
a metaphysics for and extracting a metaphysics 
from quantum mechanics.
3.1.3 Moderate naturalization
The above approach to the relation between 
metaphysics and science may be deemed by 
9  Of course, one could maintain a skeptical attitude that this is the best option for understanding quantum mechanics, given so many 
other options in the interpretive role of the theory. Arguing for this view, however, is not our purpose here, which is to offer an inventory of 
the main proposals that relate metaphysics to science.
10  To a criticism towards this standard attitude, see Bennett (2016).
11  For the claim that metaphysics can (and does) operate also with an a posteriori methodology, see Guay and Pradeu (2020); for an 
argument in which science also operates at the a priori level, see Chakravartty (2013). This is the ‘dilemma’ addressed by Robus (2015).
many as too radical, and as putting high hopes 
in the wrong place. Science, it could be claimed, 
due to metaphysical underdetermination, does 
not bring with it its own metaphysics in such a 
direct fashion. A more moderate approach is then 
recommended for those with such inclinations. 
This project is, as Morganti (2015, p. 58) states, 
“[…] metaphysics-friendly, yet naturalistic-inclined 
viewpoint”. Morganti and Tahko (2017) are the 
original proponents of the so-called “modera-
tely naturalistic metaphysics”, arguing that both 
science and metaphysics share one key feature: 
a subject matter.
According to Bennett (2016), defining a subject 
matter to metaphysics is not an easy task. As 
summarized by Paul (2012, p. 4-5), there is a stan-
dard interpretation that considers that the subject 
matter of metaphysics concerns “systematic, 
general truths concerning fundamental facts”, 
in order to describe “features of the world that 
are metaphysically prior to those of the scientific 
account”.10 Bennett (2016, p. 33, emphasis added) 
argues that metaphysics is better understood as 
“[…] the study of what there is, and what what there 
is is like, for a restricted value of ‘what”’. Hofweber 
(2016) further distinguishes the task and the do-
main of metaphysics, arguing that metaphysics, 
if it is to be considered an ambitious program, 
should have its own domain — thus heading back 
to the “standard” view.
These difficult debates notwithstanding, to the 
proponents of this kind of naturalism, the subject 
matter of both science and metaphysics is that 
of “examining and explaining reality” (MORGANTI; 
TAHKO, 2017, p. 2559). What the two disciplines 
do not share are the procedures for such an exa-
mination. While metaphysics is considered to be 
a purely a priori operation, science is considered 
an entirely a posteriori discipline. Although there 
are counterexamples to this statement,11 what 
we consider worthy of mention is the connection 
with the reality that metaphysics inherits from 
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science, when in connection with it. In this sense, 
Morganti and Tahko (2017, p. 2559) state that: “[…] 
metaphysics ought to seek an at least indirect 
connection with reality through the empirical 
methods of science”.
The epistemic priority of science, which so-
mehow transfers epistemic warrant to metaphysics 
in intersectional cases, justifies the “naturalist” part 
of the nomenclature of the project in question. The 
“moderate” part comes from the value of meta-
physics in positively contributing to a complete 
description of reality. According to the authors, 
science does not build a worldview alone. Part 
of this is the role of metaphysics. So metaphysics 
cannot be extracted from scientific theories.
This type of naturalist, then, would respond to 
Chakravartty’s Challenge like this: a clear picture 
is obtained through mutual and complementary 
work between metaphysics and science. A de-
tailed way in which this mutual work should take 
place is not specified by the authors (and, as far 
as we know, by almost anyone else). Still, they 
propose that metaphysics should be restricted 
by science — it would provide both the space 
of possibilities for the development of meta-
physical theories in the service of science and 
criteria for choosing to decide the most suitable 
metaphysics:
[…] some elements of science are prior to me-
taphysics in that science not only contributes 
to the definition of the basic possibility space 
itself, but also gathers the indications coming 
from the actual world that are necessary for 
fleshing out the various metaphysical hypothe-
ses and selecting the most appropriate […] it is a 
perfectly legitimate endeavour for metaphysics 
to engage in an abstract analysis of (meta-
physical) possibilities without seeking explicit 
confirmation from science, but this does not 
mean that such an analysis can be completely 
independent of science (MORGANTI; TAHKO, 
2017, p. 2578, emphasis added).
This is a recurring attitude in the literature on 
metametaphysics; a recent example is Bryant’s 
(2020b) proposal, according to which metaphy-
sics would have epistemic guarantees if it is 
somehow restricted by science — but see also 
Arenhart (2012) for further developments on the 
view that science can constrain metaphysics. As 
we will argue later, specifying the conditions of 
restriction is essential for the promise of ‘having 
the best of both worlds’ to be fulfilled.
In giving importance (albeit restricted) to me-
taphysics, we think that the appropriate place for 
this type of naturalism on our spectrum would 
be alongside the project of naturalized meta-
physics, but with relatively greater proximity to 
full-blooded metaphysics in relation to that: as 
we have discussed, metaphysics is autonomous 
from science in this proposal, although it must 
connect to reality through science, gathering, 
thus, epistemic warrant.
3.2 The Viking Approach
The terminology of Chakravartty’s Challenge 
was originally advanced by French (2014), for 
whom the challenge would not consist only in the 
attribution of a metaphysics (or a ‘clear picture’) 
on the top of what we adopt a realistic attitude 
about. It is also necessary to balance this search 
for metaphysics with epistemic humility, which 
is in itself also a dilemma: on the one hand, if 
metaphysicians adopt an excessively humble 
attitude, they end up staying where they feel 
epistemically safe, repeating the relevant physics, 
and not arriving in metaphysics itself (these would 
be ‘ersatz ’or ‘shallow’ realists, see also French, 
2018a); on the other hand, if they venture beyond 
science, into a genuinely ‘beyond-physics’ kind of 
metaphysics, then science could not even restrict 
the philosophical quest — in this case, the ‘floats 
free’ from science metaphysics — and that is why 
metaphysical underdetermination is something 
that can be taken for granted (this becomes ex-
plicit in French, 2018b). After all, if metaphysics 
is not determined by physics, it can always go 
deeper, even, say, the ultimate foundations of 
reality. The problem with this is that we have no 
epistemic guarantee since nothing but intuition 
serves as a guide.
The perfect balance of epistemic humility, says 
French (2014), is his “Viking Approach to meta-
physics”: the middle ground between science 
and metaphysics. This approach has this name 
because the metaphysicians of science would 
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not be responsible for producing metaphysical 
content, but for adapting the metaphysical con-
tent produced by analytical metaphysicians for 
the purposes of science, that is: to respond to 
Chakravartty’s challenge with extant metaphysics. 
So it’s a process based on plundering rather than 
developing. Later on, in a more subtle analogy, the 
Viking approach was re-named as the “Toolbox” 
approach (FRENCH; MCKENZIE, 2012; 2015), but 
the goal is the same:
[…] realists should not be content with adopting 
a ‘shallow’ form of their stance, as represen-
ted by expressing a belief in the existence of 
electrons, say, and leaving it at that. Motivated 
by ‘Chakravartty’s Challenge’ […] I suggest they 
should go ‘deep’, metaphysically speaking, and 
draw on the various devices that metaphysics 
makes available in order to offer a clearer pic-
ture of what that belief in electrons consists in 
(FRENCH, 2019, p. 22).
This metametaphysical view responds to 
Chakravartty’s Challenge using concepts availab-
le in the history of philosophy (i.e., in the traditional 
metaphysics) to provide reasoning or clarification 
of the relevant characteristics of a given scientific 
theory. Thus, it bridges science and metaphysics, 
by attributing epistemic value to metaphysical 
concepts that can be plundered and applied to 
the development of a clear picture for the posits 
of scientific theories. That is, the proposal operates 
by applying existing metaphysical concepts to 
scientific theories.
[…] modern metaphysics has, for whatever rea-
sons, set off along a different path from much 
of the philosophy of science, which has taken 
it further and further away from what are gene-
rally understood to be the fundamental featu-
res of science, particularly physics. As a result, 
current discussions about gunk and simples, 
or even ‘core’ notions such as intrinsicality and 
fundamentality, seem to bear little relation to 
how scientists conceive of the world. However, 
we nevertheless think that metaphysics offers 
an array of moves and manoeuvres, devices 
and techniques, etc., that can be profitably 
deployed to elaborate an understanding of the 
world that does mesh with what science tells 
us, where we take that understanding to, mini-
mally, go beyond a straightforward recitation of 
the scientific details. […] the toolbox approach is 
conditionalised twice over: first, of course, upon 
naturalistically inclined metaphysicians taking 
tools from the toolbox, instead of making them 
‘to order’ as it were, and thereby completely 
sidelining traditional, analytic, non-naturalised 
metaphysics; and secondly, upon those tools 
actually being useful to the interpretation of 
science as it develops (FRENCH, 2020, p. 190).
The Viking Approach argues for an unrestricted 
development of metaphysics. The justification 
for this total freedom lies in the possibility of the 
use of these “traditional” metaphysical theories 
by science. Thus, a Viking-style metaphysician 
would not be concerned with the development of 
metaphysical theories for science: on the contrary, 
science and metaphysics would operate at com-
pletely independent methodological levels, but 
philosophers of science interested in metaphysical 
aspects of scientific posits could use (or “plunder”), 
when convenient, the results obtained through the 
development of traditional metaphysics.
In this sense, we consider that the Viking Appro-
ach is at the exact center of the spectrum, between 
the full-blooded metametaphysical stances.
3.3 Meta-Popperian
Another metametaphysical approach that 
considers metaphysics to be an extra layer over 
science is the meta-Popperian, as developed 
by Arenhart (2012) and expanded by Arroyo and 
Arenhart (2019; see also Arroyo, 2020; Arenhart 
and Arroyo, 2021a). The method consists of a 
negative approach towards the metaphysics of 
science, specifically towards the metaphysical 
profiles one may add to scientific theories in order 
to address Chakravartty’s Challenge.
On the one hand, such a method works with 
the Viking/Toolbox approach, but provides us 
the elements according to which we can decide 
between metaphysical theories associated with 
scientific theories; by doing so, on the other hand, 
it shows precisely what a productive interaction 
between science and metaphysics should be, 
and exactly how science can restrict the range of 
application of metaphysics in scientific theories, 
thus being a moderately naturalistic metaphysics.
This approach bears on a distinction between 
“ontology” and “metaphysics” which has become 
fairly common in the literature (ARENHART, 2012; 
TAHKO, 2015; HOFWEBER, 2016; THOMSON-JO-
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NES, 2017; ARENHART; ARROYO, 2021b). Very 
briefly, both disciplines are individuated by their 
task, assuming that ontology deals with existen-
ce-questions and metaphysics deals with natu-
re-questions, The latter building on the former. 
From an ontological point of view, if one uses 
a Quinean metaontology of ontological com-
mitment, scientific theories give us a catalog of 
what exists — it can be naturalized so to speak 
Quine (1951, p. 65). However, the nature of the 
items in such a catalog remains unaddressed by 
science: that would be a task for metaphysics. 
Chakravartty’s Challenge then puts the debate 
in the following terms: metaphysics can be used 
to clarify science. 
So one might say that there are electrons in 
the ontology of quantum mechanics, for instance, 
and refuse to go further than that. Shallow realism 
goes here. Recall that for naturalists, what matters 
is that at least ontology is offered by science (and 
not, say, one’s intuitions). Here, it can be claimed 
that the choice is voluntary (CHAKRAVARTTY, 
2017) or based on other non-objective criteria, 
such as aesthetic beauty (BENOVSKY, 2016). As for 
the metaphysical layer, using the Viking/Toolbox 
approach we can give metaphysical flesh to the 
ontological bones of each of the interpretations. 
As there is no anchoring in physics, it is to be 
expected that there is metaphysical underdeter-
mination (ARROYO; ARENHART, 2021).
Enter the meta-Popperian to objectively 
evaluate which metaphysical profiles are not 
really options (ARENHART, 2012; ARENHART; 
ARROYO, 2021a). This method can be appre-
ciated in three steps, as presented explicitly in 
Arenhart and Arroyo (2021a). In the first step, the 
ontological commitments of a scientific theory 
in question are identified; in the second step, 
Viking/Toolbox metametaphysics is adopted, 
and the metaphysical literature is examined for 
ways in which the nature-questions of the entities 
obtained in the first step can be metaphysically 
conceived; in the third step, the options obtained 
in the previous step are evaluated, that is, the 
philosopher of science checks whether there are 
12  And its corresponding “naturalized ontology”, as Arenhart and Arroyo (2021a, 2021b) suggest.
incompatibilities between the metaphysical ways 
in which the entities may be understood and the 
obtained ontological demands of such entities, 
i.e. it is evaluated whether there are ontological 
or scientific restrictions to dress these entities 
metaphysically in a certain way. This is where the 
negative aspect of the method happens, nodding 
towards a moderately naturalized attitude: in the 
clash between science and metaphysics, it is the 
metaphysics that should be modified.
The Viking approach makes a requirement to 
have a metaphysical layer through the Chakra-
vartty’s Challenge. The meta-Popperian, on the 
other hand, does not make this requirement. All 
that is required is that if there is a metaphysical 
layer, it must be consistent with science.12 In 
this way, meta-Popperian metametaphysics is 
compatible with an attitude that additional me-
taphysics is otiose, while Viking sees a positive 
role for metaphysics. Of course, someone can 
add these requirements and adhere to the me-
ta-Popperian, but as it stands, the proposal is 
neutral in that regard.
We situate the meta-Popperian in the spec-
trum outlined in Figure 1 as a middle ground 
between the Viking Approach and the moderate 
naturalization, as it sides with science (and not 
with metaphysics) in the eventual clash between 
the two disciplines.
3.4 Dispositionalism
Much of what is at stake in disputes about the 
relation of science and metaphysics concerns 
the subject matter of metaphysics as a discipli-
ne. The common view in the literature is to treat 
metaphysics as a discourse on the fundamentals 
of reality.
Where scientists and philosophers of science, 
for example, are interested in specific objects, 
events, processes, properties, the various types 
or kinds of these things, laws of nature, causes 
and effects, and so on, metaphysics apart from 
science concerns more general or fundamental 
things and kinds of things, of which scienti-
fic subjects of interest are exemplifications 
(CHAKRAVARTTY, 2017, p. 61).
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In this sense, the subject of metaphysics would 
be different from that of physics, and the question 
of epistemic priority ends up being dispelled by the 
autonomy of the two areas. Chakravartty’s (2017, p. 
70) proposal consists in deliberately avoiding this 
debate while remaining focused on the portion of 
metaphysics that relates to science in some way.
What makes such a proposal to be placed in 
this intermediate range of the spectrum is the 
statement that a complete worldview cannot be 
built only with science, nor only with metaphysics, 
so that its positive proposal in the debate consists 
of offering a “unified picture of the metaphysics 
of scientific realism” (CHAKRAVARTTY, 2007a, p. 
xiv). Such a “unified picture” is how Chakravartty 
responds to the “challenge” that bears his name: 
understanding science as an analysis of dispositio-
nal and categorical properties. Take physics as an 
example: roughly speaking, it is a science that talks 
about putative things with certain properties such as 
mass, charge, and spin; according to Chakravartty 
(2019, p. 12), “[d]ispositionalism is simply one among 
other theories of the nature of such properties.” In 
other words, the metaphysical content that deals 
with the nature of these things, which are defined 
in terms of their properties, is provided by dispo-
sitionalism — which, in turn, allows, together with 
science, a unitary understanding of reality.
Notably, Chakravartty (2007a; 2017) chooses 
to guide his exposition with the debate about 
scientific realism as a background; in it, the gui-
ding thread would be certain epistemic virtues of 
adopting a dispositional metaphysics for science. 
Among them, Chakravartty (2017, p. 108, original 
emphasis) highlights the union between two types 
of scientific realism, realism about entities, and 
realism about structures; a metaphysics of dis-
positions would have as content the entities, but 
its object would be the structures: “dispositions 
are dispositions for relations”.
Our thread is, however, different. We are not 
willing to enter the debate here about scientific 
realism per se, but what interests us are the pers-
pectives of the relations between science and 
metaphysics. Under this view, dispositionalist 
13  See, for instance, Chakravartty (2008, p. 152).
metaphysics about properties is (probably in a 
revisionist sense) a resumption of Aristotelian 
metaphysics about causal powers.13 Chakravartty 
then defines the dispositional and categorical 
properties as follows:
Dispositions are generally described in con-
trast to ‘categorical’ properties: dispositional 
properties are usually characterized in terms 
of what happens to things having these proper-
ties under certain conditions, and categorical 
properties are usually characterized in terms 
of the static features of things, without refe-
rence to any further happenings or conditions 
(CHAKRAVARTTY, 2017, p. 102-103).
This sets up an actualist account of disposi-
tions, as is even clearer in the following example:
Everyday examples of dispositions are pro-
perties like fragility and solubility, which are 
described in terms of what typically happens 
to things having these properties when they 
are treated roughly (they break) and placed in 
solvents (they dissolve), respectively. Everyday 
examples of categorical properties are dimen-
sions (e.g., length, area, volume), shapes (e.g., 
square, cylindrical, tetrahedral), and configura-
tions or arrangements (e.g., a given molecular 
structure). The intended difference here is that 
between properties whose natures are pro-
perly described in terms of the powers they 
confer on the things having them to behave 
in particular ways in particular circumstances, 
and properties whose natures involve no such 
empowerment (CHAKRAVARTTY, 2017, p. 103).
Thus, thinking of the graphic representation 
of Figure 1 we can highlight dispositionalism 
as a metaphysical attitude close to the Viking 
Approach, but with a greater angular incidence 
to full-blooded metaphysics as it considers dis-
positionalism (whether revisionist or traditional) 
as an answer to the interaction between science 
and metaphysics. That is, this response to the 
Challenge is certainly more focused on meta-
physics than on science.
4 Discussion: the spectrum as a 
compass
The middle range of the spectrum looks really 
attractive, promising to deliver the best of both 
worlds: the depth of metaphysics and the trust 
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of science. The question that remains is: does it? 
An appropriate relationship between metaphysics 
and science has yet to be very well justified or 
even specified. Let’s recap some central points 
discussed so far.
The naturalization of metaphysics contributed 
more to a manifesto (whose highest flag was raised 
by Ladyman and Ross, 2007) in favor of reforming 
the way of thinking and doing metaphysics than 
as a positive proposal. That is, if we admit that 
science must really be taken into account in order 
to do metaphysics, we still do not know how this 
should be done. Moreover, if metaphysics can only 
go as far as science goes, then there is no room at 
all for metaphysics — this kind of proposal stays, 
employing French’s (2018a) in the ‘shallow’ waters, 
without assigning any metaphysical profile to the 
entities posited by science.
A similar criticism can be directed to the other, 
more modest proposals for naturalizing meta-
physics. The proposal for scientifically-oriented 
metaphysics really acts as an epistemic jury of 
metaphysical theories seems really promising. 
But a proposal is not yet a clearly articulated view 
as long as it remains at the level of a declaration 
of intent — and that is precisely what the litera-
ture proposing the naturalization of metaphysics 
appears to be: a letter of intent. And as much as we 
can agree with the intentions, we still don’t know 
how to apply them. So it’s not much use without it.
The same cannot be said of de Ronde’s logos 
approach. The problem with this approach is the 
tension between autonomy and continuity of 
metaphysics in relation to science, since it is not 
clear how one could, at the same time, develop 
and extract a metaphysics from quantum me-
chanics — unless some terminological distinction 
about what is actually extracted and what is 
actually developed is done, what is not done by 
the logos approach methodology. We hope that 
future work can untie these knots.
Perhaps the only one that stands out is the 
Viking Approach. In fact, it is plausible to un-
derstand Chakravartty’s approach of Chakra-
vartty within the metametaphysics of the Viking/
Toolbox Approaches, e.g., as an application of 
metaphysical profiles to science. As Chakravartty 
(2019, p. 12) acknowledges, dispositionalism is 
just a way of understanding, in metaphysical 
terms, the scientific endeavor. In this way, one 
can understand these proposals as a “Vikings’ 
pillage” (even though there seem to be some 
“tailor-made” elements, see French, 2019). On this 
interpretation, Chakravartty’s proposal would be 
better characterized as a metaphysical proposal, 
unlike the other proposals considered here, which 
are metametaphysical.
That said, we believe that, although it stands 
out from the rest, considering that it is in fact a 
proposal and not a manifesto, the Viking Approach 
does not come out unscathed. Without going into 
the merits of the functionality of French’s (2014) 
proposal, what seems to be justified is the very 
motivation of the Viking Approach. Why should 
we justify the practice of metaphysics in this way? 
Or, still, simply: why should we look to science 
for justifications for metaphysics? Is a “scientific” 
metaphysics better than a non-scientific me-
taphysics because it is… scientific simpliciter? 
And even if we leave it at that, we still have the 
problem of metaphysical underdetermination: 
if metaphysics floats free from science, then 
metaphysical underdetermination must be taken 
for granted from the start! So we will still not 
know which metaphysical profile is the correct 
profile for the entities postulated by the science 
in question, e.g., there is no scientific support to 
evaluate this question. 
To end this paper in a more positive tone, it 
seems that the “meta-Popperian method” (ARE-
NHART, 2012; ARROYO; ARENHART, 2019; ARE-
NHART; ARROYO, 2021a) captures the best of 
the worlds of the metametaphysical proposals 
available in the literature concerning the relations 
between metaphysics and science. On the one 
hand, with the distinction between ‘ontology’ and 
‘metaphysics’, it shows the gains of naturalization: 
ontology, which is concerned about what exists, 
can be naturalized if understood as a catalog of 
what exists in the world according to scientific 
theories. Metaphysics does not have this natu-
ralization prospect, i.e., it is not obtained from 
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science. But instead of promoting its unrestricted 
development, the method finds in science (and 
the corresponding ontology obtained from it) the 
guidelines for restrictions of metaphysical com-
patibility. The meta-Popperian method, in other 
words, shows in practice how science can give 
an epistemological assessment (not justification) 
of metaphysics. This is the naturalistic guise of 
the method: in the case of conflict between a 
scientific theory and a metaphysical theory, it 
is the metaphysics that must go (e.g., not the 
science that must be modified). In agreement 
with Chakravartty (2017) and Vetter (2018), we 
maintain that the epistemic value of metaphy-
sics as a discipline should not be hierarchical in 
relation to science and that it should not inherit 
epistemic value from science; nevertheless, in the 
case of clash between metaphysics and science, 
it seems that there are pragmatic reasons in stake 
to find it more fruitful to modify the metaphysical 
theory than the physical theory.
A definitive proposal for an appropriate rela-
tionship between science and metaphysics is, 
nevertheless, still a work in progress. And, as such, 
it is more ‘work’ than ‘progress’: much has been 
said about this, but little has been advanced in 
the discussion. The spectrum offered here can act 
as a metaphysical compass to guide those who 
wish to venture into the still unexplored, though 
mapped, the territory of scientific metaphysics. 
Having mapped the terrain, we know where we 
have already stepped. And it is undoubtedly easier 
to take the next step when knowing the direction 
one wants to go.
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